¥
Different variants of this assumption were profitably followed in the Boolean semantics of Keenan & Faltz(1985) and in many other works. In Winter(1994) it was shown that also cases of collective predication (e.g. Mary and John met) can be treated using the Boolean assumption without stipulative lexical ambiguities. Yet, in this paper it is argued that the Boolean assumption is too strong in one point: the lexical connection it makes between conjunctive coordinators like and and the Boolean operator of conjunction. It will be shown that some systematic empirical distinctions between conjunctive and disjunctive coordinations are hard to be accounted for if we follow the Boolean assumption as stated above. Data will be considered from cross-linguistic phenomena of morphologically null conjunctive coordinators, "wide scope" interpretation of conjunctions and modifiers sensitive to the internal structure of the coordination. The claim that these phenomena do not appear with disjunctive coordinations will be established, which is shown to be a major challenge for the Boolean assumption. It is argued that the data can be explained if the assumption is revised by assuming that Boolean conjunction is a syncategorematic semantic¨process in all natural languages. Conjunctive morphemes like and are better treated as lacking any denotational contribution to meaning. By contrast, disjunctive morphemes are standardly treated categorematically, denoted by logical disjunction as in the Boolean assumption. This distinction between conjunctive and disjunctive coordinations expresses a semantic universal about natural languages that will be referred to as the universal of coordination.
The semantic mechanism proposed for the interpretation of conjunctive coordinations involves a product logic where they are basically treated as tuples. This is a very restricted implementation of the theory of Structured Meanings in Cresswell(1985) . It accounts for "wide scope" interpretations of conjunctions as well as for the possibility to modify them in a "structure sensitive" way.
Distinctions between conjunctive and disjunctive coordinations

Zero morphology conjunction
In many languages coordination may lack an overt coordinator. The conjuncts are juxtaposed without any material inbetween. Payne(1985) stresses that the interpretation of the coordination in these cases is systematically conjunctive. Payne distinguishes between obligatory and optional zero strategies. The obligatory strategy appears in the Samoyed languages (spoken in north ex-USSR) and in Pacoh (spoken in Mon-Khmer, Vietnam, see (1)). In these languages there is no conjunctive morpheme and the only way to express conjunction is by juxtaposition of the conjuncts. In the optional zero strategy a conjunctive morpheme exists but can be omitted. Languages with this strategy include Turkish (see (2)), Tatar, and Vietnamese.
(1) do [ VP chǒ t ¡ oq cayâq chǒ t ¡ oq apây] (from Payne(1985:26) ) she return to husband return to grandmother "She returns to (her) husband and returns to (her) grandmother" Payne(1985:25) ) you, I and / Ø brother-your "you, I and your brother" Payne notes that no language was found to have an obligatory zero strategy with respect to disjunction (p.39) and concludes: "On the whole, it is rare to find anything unusual in disjunction"(p.40). A related fact is the trivial observation that consequent sentences in discourse normally convey propositional conjunction. For example, the discourse in (3a) is logically equivalent to the sentential conjunction in (3b). A similar case is parataxis £ as in the Hebrew sentence (4).
(3) a. John is talking. Mary is walking. b. John is talking and Mary is walking.
(4) imi xaya, ani, axi, hukarnu kenexey cahal. (from Ha'aretz, 28 April 1995) mother-1:sg chaya, I, brother-1:sg, recognized-past-1:pl as-disabled-pl IDF "My mother Chaya, I, my brother, were recognized as disabled (because of) IDF service"
Certain languages probably lack coordination as familiar to English speakers. Two such cases are Maricopa (see Gil(1991) ) and Dyribal (see Dixon(1972) ). The Maricopa sentence (5) might seem to involve a zero disjunction strategy:
(5) Johnš Billš v?aawuumšaa. John-nom Bill-nom 3-come-pl-fut-infer "John or Bill will come" (from Gil(1991:102)) However, Gil notes that if the suffixšaa on the verb in (5) is omitted the interpretation of the sentence becomes conjunctive. This particle indicates uncertainty like the auxiliary may in English. A similar point is shown in Dixon(1972:363, example (693) ) with the Dyribal particle yamba ("perhaps, might be"). A related phenomenon in English has to do again with juxtaposed sentences:
(6) Who's coming to the party? Mary is coming, John is coming... I don't know. Here too, the apparent zero disjunction appears with an overt modal expression. Concluding, a generalization adequate to the facts described above seems to be: (G ¥ ) Many languages allow various forms of zero conjunction. Zero disjunction is very rare and appears only with some overt expression indicating uncertainty.
"Wide scope" coordination
A phenomenon that has important implications for theories of coordination and quantification is one that is sometimes referred to as "the scope of coordination". I will use this term in a descriptive and theoretically neutral sense:
Terminology: A sentence that contains a structure [ X
¥
coor X¨] Y has a wide scope reading for the coordination iff it has a reading paraphrased using the structure
A central empirical claim of this paper is that while "wide scope"(WS) conjunction is a rather common phenomenon in English, WS disjunction appears only in certain restricted cases. Consider first the sentence: (7) John sold and bought a car.
(following Hendriks(1993:52)) a. NS:
¢ ¡
H H
The prominent reading of (7) is not the narrow scope coordination reading in (7a) which requires one car both sold and bought, but rather the WS reading in (7b), paraphrased as "John sold a car and bought a car". To see this consider a situation in which John sold his old Ford and bought a new BMW. This is a situation distinguishing the NS from the WS reading, henceforth a critical situation (CS). In this situation (7a) is contingent whereas (7b) is true. (7) can be used truthfully in this situation, so the WS reading (7b) is attested.2 As far as conjunction is concerned, this fact agrees with the claim in Hendriks(1993:52-53) Consider a CS in which the houses are A,B,C and D. John sold houses A and B and bought houses C and D. According to (8a), (8) should be true. According to (8b) the sentence should be false. It seems that (8a) gives the correct prediction: it is hard to think of this situation as falsifiying (8). Thus, conjunctions as in (7) exhibit a WS reading whereas disjunctions of the same structure as in (8) The non-equivalences are (9a-b), (10b), (11a) and (12a). Thus, coordination scope should be in principle visible in the cases: and/or in the restriction of a universal, or in the scope of a universal, and in the restriction/scope of an existential. Examples (7) and (8) Partee & Rooth(1983) ) This evidence is of the weaker type, similar to the contrast (7)- (8), but it strengthens the observation on WS conjunction, in distinction to WS disjunction.
However, WS or does seem to appear in examples like:
(19) John is looking for a cat or a dog. (following Rooth & Partee(1982) )
In a situation where John is looking for a cat (de dicto: any cat, not a specific one) but not for a dog it seems that (19) can be interpreted as true, which attests a WS reading for the coordination. Namely: "John is looking for a cat or looking for a dog, but I don't know which of the two kinds of pets is he looking for." More will be said about this type of examples in section 4. In the meantime, a bibliographical note is in place: although many works deal with WS disjunction in intensional contexts as in (19) (a non exhaustive list: Rooth & Partee(1982) , Larson(1985) , Hendriks(1993) , Emms(1993 ), Carpenter(1994 , Moltmann(1992) ), neither of these studies provides evidence for WS or in extensional contexts as in (7)- (8), (13)- (18). The fact that WS or is not attested in these cases calls for an explanation. The distinctions found between the scope of conjunction and disjunction are summarized in the following generalization:
(G¨) WS and is attested for many different configurations in English. WS or is attested only in the presence of some intensional operator.
An empirical caveat:
Even without getting into subtleties of plurals and complex syntactic constructions it should be noted that with the indefinite article WS interpretation of common noun conjunction is hard, if not impossible, whereas NS is easy to get. Compare (20a) and (20b). I will not address this question here.
(20) a. ? John likes some man and woman. b. John likes some officer and gentleman.
"Structure sensitive" adverbials -alternately, respectively
The semantic operation of certain adverbials in English is another challenge for the Boolean assumption about conjunctive coordinations. One problem with the adverb alternately is discussed in Lasersohn(1992) . For example, consider the sentences:
(21) a. The cable runs alternately above ground and below ground. b. John was alternately hot and cold. (from Lasersohn(1992))
Lasersohn shows that it is hard to get the correct interpretation of such sentences if we traditionally apply GC to some standard denotation of the conjuncts. Roughly, in (21b) if the conjunction is analyzed using the logical expression
are temporal predicates (functions from points of time to sets), then it denotes for every point of time the set of entities which are both hot and cold at the same time. Reasonably, this is always the empty set, which makes compositional modification using alternately impossible. Intuitively, the adverbial "needs access" to the separate denotations of the conjuncts to produce the semantics of alternation. However, such problems do not appear with or: the adverbial alternately cannot modify a disjunctive coordination. Contrast (21a-b) with:
(22) a. * The cable runs alternately above ground or below ground.
b. * John was alternately hot or cold.
A similar point holds for the adverbial respectively: it seems impossible to analyze (23) with a GC denotation for and, but disjunctions as in (24) are not licensed. 
Analysis
The facts summarized in (G
) are a challenge to the Boolean assumption: if conjunctive and disjunctive coordinations are symmetrically treated using the Boolean operators what can be the origin for the systematic distinctions between them? An additional technical problem is posed by the facts in (G¨) and (G ¢ ): the straightforward semantics for conjunctive morphemes cannot account for WS effects and "structure sensitive" modification without further mechanisms.
The proposed conceptual change in the Boolean assumption is the following: we hypothesize that in all natural languages the semantics of conjunctive coordinations is not derived by any lexical semantic value for the (null/overt) coordinator. GC is to be used as a basic derivational semantic process in human languages. ¤ GD standardly denotes morphemes like or. I refer to this hypothesis as:
The Universal of Coordination: Conjunction is syncategorematic. Disjunction is categorematic.
The implementation relies on this universal. It is proposed that conjunctive coordinations are represented using Structured Meanings of the conjuncts denotations. This is the axiom of product introduction: from any two juxtaposed denotations . It is a very restricted implementation of Cresswell(1985) 's theory of mental attitudes. Conjunctive coordinations are treated as derivationally ambiguous between two readings: (i) An "intersective" reading, obtained by free application of GC to the conjunct denotations. (ii) A "product" reading, obtained by the axiom of product introduction. The first possibility maintains the similarity between conjunction and disjunction. The second is responsible for WS and "structure sensitivity" effects, special to conjunctive coordinations. Let us substantiate these ideas, dealing with the problems mentioned in section 2.
Zero morphology conjunction
It should be noticed that the challenge (G ¥ ) poses to the Boolean assumption is not a descriptive one. We can stipulate in cases of zero conjunction a null element conveying the meaning of GC. But the main question remains unanswered: why can only conjunctive coordinators be morphologically null and not disjunctive ones? The universal of coordination provides an answer: a null element is not assumed because the semantic operation of GC is null anyway-it is in the "hard core" of natural language grammar(s). There exist languages with zero conjunction because morphemes like and are not necessary for conveying logical conjunction. There are no languages with zero disjunction because expressions with the function of or are semantically necessary (there is no operation of disjunction in the grammar), therefore they cannot be dispensed with if a language is to convey logical disjunction at all. The major cross-linguistic variations concerning the (non-)realization of conjunctive morphems are conceived as a result of morpho-syntactic processes that do not necessarily affect the semantic interpretation. Such processes are not directly related to the present discussion; these variations should be accounted for whatever semantic theory of coordination we adopt. To make things a bit more concrete, let me exemplify this line of reasoning using the following, somewhat trivial discourse: By the semantics of conjunction
. We conclude that the entailment S ¥ S¨£ S ¥ and S¨in fact 2 holds. A similar reasoning is possible with the universal of coordination since a conjunctive coordination always has the standard "intersective" reading like the one assigned by the Boolean assumption.
However, fact 1 is not explained by the Boolean assumption alone: in (25)- (26) there is no conjunctive coordinator, so why does the assertion of two consecutive sentences assert each of the sentneces separately? We must assume some morphologically null process of conjunction in discourse. This is what the univeral of coordination claims. But if such a process is to be assumed then there is no special virtue to the assumption that and conveys propositional conjunction: the conjunctive interpretation is available also if and is meaningless, using the free process. Therefore, if we want to account for fact 1, we must assume a mechanism which makes the Boolean assumption dispensable for conjunction.
In cases of sentence internal conjunction, the universal of coordination makes similar predictions with respect to the cross-linguistic data. It claims that similarly to the free process of propositional conjunction in the interpretation of consecutive sentences in discourse, GC can apply also within the sentence in all languages, with no respect to the morphological presence of the conjunctive coordinator.
But how is the apparent zero disjunction as in (5) and (6) explained? As stated in (G ¥ ), this question is empirically less central. Still, it is an interesting one. At least a partial answer comes from Gil's observation that the rare cases of zero disjunction appear with some expression signalizing uncertainty, like the suffixšaa in (5) and the clause I don't know in (6). It can be proposed that such expressions encode a semantic function of disjunction that applies to the structured meaning denoting the coordination and therefore blocks application of GC at this level. Surprisingly, cases where WS disjunction appears also involve some intensional particle. A possible approach to these cases is proposed in section 4.
"Wide scope" conjunction
More technically speaking, it is assumed above that the logic used to represent natural language sentences includes types with a product constructor 
The coordinator and, like zero morphology, is analyzed as lacking any denotation.
(ii) An optional stage: applying the operator GC:
Because (ii) is optional, the conjunctive coordination is ambiguous between the product reading and the intersective reading. A disjunction is not ambiguous in this way because the coordinator has the GD denotation so GC cannot apply:
To see how this mechanism works consider the following sentences:
(28) Every officer and gentleman danced.
(29) Every officer or gentleman danced.
Consider first the narrow scope derivation for the coordinations:
(28) a.
U U
o fficer and gentlemanb
In (28a) the optional operation of GC interprets the conjunction, which leads to a NS reading. In (29a) the disjunction is standardly interpreted as the NS reading. In order to get the WS reading of (28) . We will add a principle to the system to handle this kind of situation. Intuitively, we let the function every' apply pointwise to the coordinates in the product ¡ . This will be done using the following type schema: 
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are the left and right coordinates of¨, respectively, when¨is a tuple. These operators are undefined for non-tuples. The effect of this semantics is that whenever we have a The analysis of (13)- (18) is similar. However, the analysis of (7) depends on our treatment of transitive predicates and quantifier scope. The apparent WS disjunction in (19) also involves some problems of a larger scale. The discussion of these problems is deferred to section 4.
"Structure sensitive" adverbials
In Lasersohn(1992: 408) the following claim was made: "Structured Meanings provide the means for a straightforward and technically unproblematic account of alternately". I will support this claim by exemplifying the way in which the account given above for WS conjunction applies naturally also to sentences with adverbials like alternately and respectively. According to the line proposed, such adverbials denote functions that get a product type argument. The semantic operation can then apply using the separate denotations of the conjuncts, which are available in the product representation of the conjunction. Consider first the case of alternately in (21b), restated as (30) and paraphrased following Lasersohn as in (31) Whether (31) is a completely adequate paraphrase of (30) is not our main concern here. What is crucial is the way the adverbial is sensitive to the separate denotations of the conjuncts. Assume argument. The paraphrase in (31) leads to the following definition:
). Principle (R¨) cannot resolve this type mismatch since is not a product but a function over products. For similar considerations also disjunctive coordinations do not have the appropriate type as arguments for alternately. Thus, sentences like (22a-b) are semantically ill formed. A similar treatment accounts for the semantics of respectively as in (23) , and separately their second coordinates, to produce one tuple. GC can then apply to derive the meaning of the sentence. The analysis of (32) tinctions between conjunctive and disjunctive coordinations. Some of the many problems that still need to be treated are discussed in the following section.
Some broader theoretical issues
Quantifiers scope and flexibility
Reconsider (7), restated here: (33) John sold and bought a car. a. John sold a car and bought a car. To derive the WS conjunction reading of (33), paraphrased in (33a), we should concentrate on the way the transitive predicate applies to the indefinite object. I will assume that the indefinite is standardly represented as a generalized quantifier of type , which gets a quantifier argument. It will be claimed that (G¨) shows an empirical advantage to the flexible approach using a "lazy" strategy of type lifting originating in P&R. Consider first the Montague approach. As P&R(p.365) point out, this approach predicts that all transitive verb coordinations are interpreted as having a WS reading without any additional mechanism. As claimed in (G¨), this is inadequate for or coordinations.
In the syntactic scope approach an opposite problem appears: even the mechanism proposed above cannot provide the WS conjunction reading of (33). The Q in analysis of the sentence is: . We might try to derive from this representation (using a principle like (R¨)) an equivalent to:
. However, this still leads to a NS reading since both free occurrences of ¡ are bound by the quantifier denotation
. A way to solve this in the scope approach is to assume a syntactic reconstruction of the object to get the paraphrase (33a). But according to (G¨), we have to explain why this process does not apply in or coordinations, which seems a hard task.
In the flexible approach to quantifier scope the picture changes a little. Simplifying many details of the mechanism in Hendriks(1993) , the main operation for analyzing (33) U U s ell and buyb
Thus, lazy application of ¡ with the product mechanism proposed can allow WS readings of transitive verb conjunction without deriving WS disjunction. This is of course a very sketchy proposal for the interaction between quantifiers and conjunction scope. However, the crucial point is that (G¨) provides evidence for a "lazy" implementation of Hendriks's operator. The somewhat radical view in Hendriks(1993) that expressions can have an infinite number of denotations is replaced by P&R's more economical flexibility. Note that also the transitions (R ¥ ) and (R¨) are employed in a lazy fashion: (R ¥ ) applies to conjuncts, which cannot functionally apply to each other; (R¨) can be used to apply only when a tuple and another expression that cannot be interpreted using functional application are juxtaposed. Elsewhere ¥ 2 ¥ I show how Partee & Rooth's principle of "lazy flexibility" can be formally defined using Klein & Sag(1985) 's Type Driven Translation.
"Wide scope" or, attitudes and structured meanings
Throughout this paper a constant effort is made to provide WS readings only for conjunctive coordinations while avoiding WS disjunction. As indicated above, this is not the common practice in the literature. It has been often assumed that the kind of phenomena exemplified by sentence (19), restated below, should be explained using the same mechanism that accounts for WS conjunction.
(36) John is looking for a cat or a dog. a. John is looking for a cat or is looking for a dog. Rooth & Partee(1982) point out that (36) has a de dicto interpretation equivalent to (36a), not derived by the Montagovian treatment of intensionality. There are two possible conclusions: either some additional mechanism is responsible for the problematic reading, or something is wrong in Montague's possible world semantics for intensions. I will argue that: (i) If some additional mechanism is proposed to handle the WS of coordinations in intensional contexts, it is problematic to assume that it is the same mechanism responsible for WS conjunctions in extensional contexts.
(ii) There is reason to think that the structured meanings approach to attitudes does not face the problem Montague's approach faces here. This suggests that (36) introduces a challenge for a theory of intensionality and not for a theory of coordination like the one proposed in this paper. First, it seems that the problem generally occurs with coordination in the complement of mental attitude verbs. Consider the de dicto reading of (37): (37) Mary says that John is going to marry Sue or Sue is going to divorce Bill.
a. Mary says something equivalent to "John is going to marry Sue or Sue is going to divorce Bill". b. Mary says something equivalent to "John is going to marry Sue" or something equivalent to "Sue is going to divorce Bill".
If Mary says "Sue and John are going to get married" and does not actually speak of Sue and Bill it seems (37) is true in case the speaker is not sure what Mary says. (37a) is false in this situation and (37b) is true, so it seems the latter is a paraphrase of an available reading for (37). It is hard to compare (37) with a minimally different sentence with a conjunctive complement: if we replace in (37) the or with an and the revised paraphrases we get instead of (37a-b) become hardly distinguishable. However, with other attitude verbs the same tricky phenomenon seem to appear:
(38) Mary denies that John is going to marry Sue and Sue is going to divorce Bill. a. Mary says something falsifying the sentence "John is going to marry Sue and Sue is going to divorce Bill". b. Mary says something falsifying the sentence "John is going to marry Sue" and something falsifying the sentence "Sue is going to divorce Bill".
Consider a situation in which Mary says: "I do not think John and Sue are going to get married but I'm sure Sue and Bill are going to divorce". It seems that in such a situation (38) can be interpreted as false, which attests reading (38b).
Independently, (G¨) shows motivation not to derive WS disjunction in extensional contexts. Moreover, while the "scope" of conjunction in extensional contexts seems to obey similar syntactic restrictions to the "scope" of quantification (see the following subsection), coordination in intensional contexts does not: in (37) and (38) the scope of the coordination appears over a that clause, unlike for example the scope of the quantifier in (39), which does not get the reading (39a):
(39) Mary says/denies that every student made noise.
a. * For every student Mary says/denies that he/she made noise.
In short, it seems that WS coordination in intensional contexts requires a different mechanism than the WS conjunction phenomena discussed in sections 2-3. The structured meanings approach to intensionality might shed some light on the problem. A crucial point in Cresswell(1985) is that an attitude to a proposition can be analyzed like any relation to an entity of type
5
. A propositional entity can have a fine structure, reflecting the structure of the sentence it stands for. A sentence like (40) can be modeled following a rough paraphrase as in (40a): (40) Mary says that John is going to marry Sue. a. Mary is in a relation of saying to a propositional entity representing the sentence "John is going to marry Sue".
For further details about this idea see Cresswell(1985) . The central point for the present discussion is that there is no substantial difference in this approach between the predication in (40) and predication in extensional sentences like Mary meets John. In both cases the relation is between individuals, only in (40) one individual stands for a proposition. Thus, there is also no substantial difference between sentence (37) and a sentence like Mary meets John or Bill. But, in (37) the or coordination can be analyzed in two ways: (i) or in one disjunctive attitude.
(ii) or in a disjunction between attitudes. Roughly, the analysis is as in (41a-b):
(41) a. Mary is in a relation of saying to the entity representing the disjunctive sentence "John is going to marry Sue or Sue is going to divorce Bill". b. Mary is in a relation of saying to the a disjunction of the entities representing the sentences "John is going to marry Sue", "Sue is going to divorce Bill".
(41a) reflects the NS disjunction (within one attitude) in (37). (41b) reflects WS disjunction (between attitudes). (41b) should be derived from (37) standardly like any disjunction between entities (e.g. by lifting individuals to quantifiers and applying GD). If this intuitive proposal can be substantiated in a theory of mental attitudes, it might explain how or gets WS only in intensional contexts. Also, the structural restrictions on WS interpretation might turn out to be irrelevant since the cases of pseudo-WS over intensional verbs are a subcase of standard predication and do not involve any special scope mechanism.
Syntactic island constraints and a possible synthesis
The main concern so far was how to allow WS conjunction and "structure sensitive" modification. Nothing was said about possible constraints on the mechanism. As for the scope of quantification, it is widely accepted that syntactic islands that restrict overt extraction (e.g. of wh phrases) govern also the scope of quantifiers. The null hypothesis (also expressed in Hendriks(1993:96) ) is that the same constraints restrict also the scope of conjunction. A convenient case to check this is the Complex NP constraint. These facts suggest that the connection in the product mechanism between WS conjunction and structure sensitive modification has an empirical motivation-both phenomena seem to be restricted by similar constraints. Moreover, sentence (44) shows a direct relation between the phenomenon of WS conjunction and alternately modification: (44) must be read as WS equivalent to (44a). If alternately is omitted, as in (46), the conjunction also has a NS reading, paraphrased as: "John was with people, each of them was both from France and from England". The mechanism proposed directly predicts this fact: as stressed in the analysis of (30), alternately cannot apply to a conjunction if GC applies to derive a NS reading.
Conclusions
Drawing a line between the semantics of conjunctive coordinations and the Boolean operator of conjunction is not an easy theoretical move. In this paper I tried to show some central motivations for such a step. The way it was done was shown to lead to a more comprehensive semantic model of coordination.
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Sentences of the same structure as (7) often do not get a WS reading without some pressure from our world knowledge. As claimed in Partee & Rooth(1983) , it is hard to observe any entailment from (ii) to (i): (i) John caught and ate a fish. (ii) John caught a fish and ate a fish. If John caught only one fish and ate another one (ii) is certainly true. Whether (i) can be asserted then is at least not clear. However, P&R's general conclusion is problematic as sentences like (7) show, in agreement with Hendriks(1993:52) .
£
See Micheaux(1991) for a descriptive survey of similar facts in French. An idea which might have to do with this is the special treatment given to the indefinite article in the DRT tradition, where the indefinite article lacks any direct contribution to meaning. So, it is possible that in this treatment WS can be technically avoided in CN conjunctions. However, the mystery is even more interesting: with the generic interpretation for indefinites WS does seem to appear. Consider a variation on (15): (i) Mozart is easy to play for a pianist over 60 years old and below 20 years old. Conjunction scope in the generic (i) behaves like with the universal in (15).
¤
A similar idea is seminally expressed in Gil(1991) . Carlson(1983) discusses some problematic phenomena with the Latin morpheme que, but his conclusions are somewhat different. However, see the discussion of example (20) .
¥
An open question for this line is why cannot we have a disjunctive interpretation in a variation of (6) with an overt conjunctive morpheme: (i) ? Who's coming? Mary is coming and John is coming... I don't know. A possible answer is revising the approach in the spirit of Carlson(1983) to analyze and as a "marking morpheme" requiring application of GC at some possibly higher compositional level. However, this would leave cases of alternately...and... unexplained, since as we shall see below in these cases GC is unnecessary. I leave this question open, so the impossibility of (i) remains problematic.
